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Diaspora and its Increasing Importance 
 
In this globalized world, millions of people live outside their country of origin. 
Today, almost every country has a diaspora and almost every 
ethnic/religious/cultural group has a diaspora somewhere in the world. 
Recently, diaspora’s role in conflict and conflict resolution has become one of 
the major research interests. Especially after 9/11, which drew attention to the 
“home-grown terrorists” and accordingly to immigrants in the hostlands, 
understanding the behavior of diaspora communities gained significance.  
Diaspora activism in terms of political support to insurgent movements, sending 
remittances back home and participating in homeland affairs became highly 
significant. Consequently, it became particularly important for researchers to 
understand the dynamics of diaspora groups in today’s conflicts.1 
 
When it comes to examining the attachments that the diaspora communities 
have towards their homeland, some of the most commonly mentioned concepts 
are long-distance nationalism2 transnational loyalties, and diasporic-identity 
formation. These concepts pave the way to bringing about a better 
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understanding about the different levels of loyalty to the homeland and enables 
us to explain how these sentiments emerge, and reveal themselves. One also must 
look into the conditions that help the long-distance nationalist sentiments 
emerge among migrant communities. For instance, there are new trends in 
migrant integration to consider. Demmers argues: “as it has become increasingly 
hard to settle and assimilate in the hostland, diasporas are more likely to 
continue to focus on their erstwhile homeland.”3 Many states are moving away 
from the idea of assimilating their ethnic minorities towards integrating them. At 
the same time, minority diaspora groups no longer desire to abandon their pasts.4 
Today what we have at hand is many different diaspora groups in many different 
host countries that are trying to influence policy making in both home and host 
countries. 
 
In this context, one paradigmatic example for diasporas that do not desire to 
leave their past behind and carry on being concerned about the homeland politics 
are the so called “stateless diasporas.” The urge to keep their primordial roots 
and the recent history constant and vibrant in members’ minds is particularly 
important for this type of diaspora groups.5 Political activity is much higher 
within the stateless diaspora communities as compared to other types of 
diasporas, especially if they are united around an idea of secession and/or there 
is an on-going conflict in the homeland. 
 
This paper explores the trends of long-distance nationalism within the stateless 
diaspora groups and provides a framework of actions committed by those groups 
in the context of homeland politics. Diaspora groups’ actions are analyzed 
through a social movements perspective, in particular by looking at the protest 
and propaganda repertoires of the two stateless diaspora groups. Both of these 
diaspora groups come from a conflicted homeland where there is or was an on-
going armed conflict. Additionally, both groups are very politically active in 
Europe. The focus is to demonstrate how these diaspora groups use repertoires 
of actions to bring the attention of their host country to the contentious politics 
in their homeland.  
 
Defining “Diaspora” 
 
In the past, the concept of “diaspora” applied primarily to Jews, Greeks, 
Armenians and Africans. However, recently, at least thirty ethnic groups declare 
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themselves, or are described by others, as a diaspora.6 At present, in academic 
works, as well as journalistic, nearly every migrant group is referred to as a 
diaspora proving that the term is under threat of concept stretching. While 
almost all authors criticize the multiple meanings and try to avoid the vagueness 
of the term, they often give their own definition. For instance, Sheffer defines 
“diaspora” as ethnic minority groups of migrant origins residing and acting in 
host countries but maintaining strong sentimental and material links with their 
countries of origin-their homelands.7 Alternatively, Safran identifies diaspora as 
“...segment of people living outside the homeland.”8 As a matter of fact some 
definitions are too broad which makes them meaningless in analytical terms: and 
on the other hand some definitions are so detailed that they do not refer to the 
immigrant groups, which are accepted as diasporas by a large number of 
researchers and academics. It is obvious that a working definition of the concept 
of “diaspora” is highly necessary.  
 
However, one should keep in mind that the main concern with the definitional 
ambiguity of the term is the extent to which diaspora is an essential or a 
constructed category.9 Such an argument links the diaspora debate to the 
constructivist explanations of understanding collective identities. One might 
argue that the emergence of diaspora groups could be explained by the 
essentialist point of view: a natural and an automatic result of migration, exile or 
dispersion.10 According to this viewpoint; “diaspora is a monolithic body, a 
group related to the people in the home country by affinity ties; kin and 
common descent.”11 While some authors perceive diasporas as members of an 
ethnic community who live outside the homeland; others argue that diaspora is 
more than an essentialist form of ethnic group members. It is an elite mobilized 
political project, and diaspora identity is constructed, rather than a natural result 
of mass migration. At this point, an understanding of different approaches to the 
emergence of “diaspora identity” is useful. One might engage with the analysis of 
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diaspora mobilization by taking it for granted that the “diaspora” is an outcome 
of the current transnational environment and it is created by a strategic identity-
creation mechanism by certain elite groups.12  
 
One should also place emphasis on the heterogeneity of diaspora groups. For 
instance, Smith has brought together various articles on diaspora groups and 
their role in international conflict. As a result of comparing various cases, has 
arrived at the conclusion that “diaspora groups are internally heterogeneous… 
and different parts of the same diaspora can and do have different interests, 
defined among other things by class, gender, generation, occupation and 
religion...”13 Therefore it is very important to avoid generalizations when we talk 
about a diaspora community in general.  
 
Having singled out the main debate about the concept of diaspora and its 
constituencies, it is essential to underline that this paper does approach the 
diaspora debate from a constructivist point of view. This paper places emphasis 
on the political orientation of the group members and defines diaspora as a 
political project. Diaspora is not a natural result of mass migration and there is a 
difference between migrant communities and diaspora groups. Diasporas are 
composed of certain members of immigrant communities who maintain ties to 
the homeland with a strong sense of belonging, no matter whether the homeland 
are an existing country, an imaginary one, or one that is to be saved. They show 
this sense of belonging by actively participating in their hostland’s political or 
social spheres.  They try to become involved in homeland politics, try to affect 
decision making in both home and host countries. They try to make things 
better in their terms for a country to which they may never return. Diasporas are 
multi-layered and those layers are open to mobility. Their aims are manifold and 
not static. Therefore, the repertoires of actions listed in the following pages 
cannot be attributed to the whole diaspora community, let alone representative. 
Nevertheless, the aim here is to understand the spectrum of actions within the 
stateless diaspora groups. 
 
Long-Distance Nationalism and Stateless Diaspora Groups 
 
More often than not the concept of long distance nationalism has a negative 
connotation and is usually used to describe the relationship between diasporas 
and conflict. Diasporas are considered marginal groups who do not give up easily 
on matters that are related to homelands and conflicts and they usually are 
reluctant to make concessions for peace. At this point it is worth quoting 
                                                 
12 See Adamson., Constructing the Diaspora. & Anderson., The New World Disorder., & 
Anderson., Long-distance Nationalism. 
13 Hazel Smith. “Diasporas in international conflict” In H. Smith & P. Stares (Eds.), Diasporas in 
Conflict: peace-makers or peace-wreckers? (pp. 3-16). Tokyo: United Nations University Pres 
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Anderson’s paragraph at length from his famous chapter on long-distance 
nationalism: 
 
…today’s long distance nationalism strikes one as a probably menacing 
portent for the future. First of all, it is the product of capitalism’s 
remorseless, accelerating transformation of all human societies. Second, it 
creates a serious politics that is at the same time radically unaccountable. The 
participant rarely pays taxes in the country in which he does his politics; he is 
not answerable to its judicial system; he probably does not cast even an 
absentee ballot in its elections because he is a citizen in a different place; he 
need not fear prison, torture or death, nor need his immediate family. But, 
well and safely positioned in the First World, he can send money and guns, 
circulate propaganda, and build intercontinental computer circuits, all of 
which can have incalculable consequences in zones of their ultimate 
destinations14  
 
It is argued that since diaspora groups no longer live in the homeland and 
consequently do not suffer from the absence of peace conditions, they keep their 
emotional attachments to the holy homeland and make the conflicts even more 
protracted by not sacrificing their cause on the way to a peaceful settlement. He 
further argues: 
 
“Third, his politics unlike those of activists for global human rights or 
environmental causes are neither intermittent nor serendipitous. They are 
deeply rooted in a consciousness that his exile is self-chosen and that the 
nationalism he claims on e-mail is also on the ground on which, he embattled 
ethnic identity is to be fashioned in the ethnicized nation state that remains 
determined to inhabit. That same metropole that marginalizes and 
stigmatizes him simultaneously enables him to play, in a flash, on the other 
side of the planet, national hero.”15 
 
Anderson’s arguments are supported by other research, including Paul Collier’s 
work on diaspora contribution to civil war. However, differently from the 
previous arguments, Schiller argues that long-distance nationalism does not 
necessarily refer to malignant activities. The actions may include voting, 
demonstrating, lobbying, monetary contributions, and creating works of art 
besides fighting, killing and dying.16 What we also see is that diaspora 
communities tend to create a softer version of the conflict dynamics back home 
in the hostland and produce their own way of “struggle” such as protests, public 
demonstrations, theatre plays, lobby activities etc. 
 
                                                 
14 Anderson., Long-distance Nationalism, .p.74. 
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One of the most dynamic diaspora groups that are involved in the long distance 
activities in both ways mentioned above are the “stateless diaspora groups.” 
These groups are not linked to a state but have a collective identity based on 
mostly ethnicity if not religion. In Sheffer’s terms: “The stateless diasporas are 
those dispersed segments of nations that have been unable to establish their own 
independent states17” Stateless diasporas are considered to be more active in 
terms of involvement to homeland politics and to be more attached to their past. 
Especially if there is a struggle in their country of origin for secession, they are 
more likely to engage in political movements in the host countries. According to 
Sheffer, in such cases, the diaspora members will be torn between the memories 
of the homeland and wishing to recapture the past, and trying to reconcile with 
the new norms in the host countries.18Yet, it is a fact that the arguments above 
do not hold true among all members of the diaspora group equally. There will be 
different segments which firstly perceive homeland politics from different points 
of view and secondly perform actions differently in a selective way from a large 
spectrum of forms of actions.  
 
Diasporic Activism in the Social Movements  
 
It is surprising that the scholars who work in social movement theory have not 
discovered what the generous research area of diaspora studies might offer to 
them or vice versa. At a first glance one might argue that there are significant 
differences between social movements and diaspora movements. However it is 
also hard not to see the commonalities. Diaspora movements share many 
characteristics with social movements and digging deeper in the social 
movements literature might actually help to analyze diaspora activism in a more 
systematic way. 
 
There are a few authors, such as Sökefeld and Adamson, who made very 
important and successful attempts to combine the two fields together. Sökefeld 
approached diaspora groups as transnational imagined communities. Since we 
assume that diaspora organization has a lot to do with social mobilization, the 
study of diaspora should be inspired from the social movements analysis which is 
concerned with the main questions of how and why people mobilize for certain 
collective goals.19 Adamson as well, when discussing diasporic identity, made an 
attempt to bring the social movements and diaspora perspectives together in 
order to explain the nature of diaspora groups. According to her, the framework 
of social movements which is concerned with strategic social construction and 
transnational-identity formation may shed light on a better understanding of 
                                                 
17 Sheffer., Diaspora Politics.,p. 73. 
18 Ibid. 
19 Martin Sökefeld, “Mobilizing in Transnational Space: A Social Movement Approach to the 
Formation of Diaspora.” , Global Networks,  6, 3 (2006); 265-284. p. 268. 
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diaspora mobilization.20 The abundant literature on social movements studies 
cannot be discussed here, but some important aspects, will be briefly singled out 
below.  
 
If one looks into the definitions in the social movements research, it is not hard 
to find useful mechanisms and analytical tools, which can also be used for 
studying the diaspora movements. For instance, an old but a commonly cited 
definition is that of Wilson: “A social movement is a conscious, collective, 
organized attempt to bring about or resist large-scale change in the social order 
by non-institutionalized means.21” An alternative definition would be: “…any 
sentiment or activity shared by two or more people oriented toward changes in 
social relations or in the social system.”22 In another study, social movements are 
also defined as movements that occur as a result of an interactional process 
which centers around the articulation of a collective identity and occurs within 
the boundaries of a particular society.23 In diaspora research, the focus is also on 
the interactional processes and the collective identity but in a transnational 
context. Yet, there is also a growing literature on Transnational Social 
Movements (TSMs) that has been boosted by the globalization discussions.  
 
Della Porta and Diani offer four characteristic aspects of social movements by 
taking into account the work of various scholars from various theoretical and 
territorial backgrounds: Informal interaction networks, shared beliefs and 
solidarity, collective action focusing on conflicts and use of protest.24Informal 
networks of groups and individuals meant that as an activist you are part of a 
network and you participate in the actions of those networks. Sharing beliefs and 
solidarity means sharing a collective identity maybe not in a totally unified 
manner but still sharing similar symbols and over time framing them differently 
then as in the case of ethnicity or religion and finally giving those ideas a voice 
through protest. According to Della Porta and Diani, this kind of a 
categorization may allow them to better distinguish social movements from other 
types of collective action such as interest groups or political parties. However, 
with this explanation, diaspora movements still fall into the category of social 
movements by their peculiar nature of lacking opportunities of access differently 
                                                 
20 Adamson., Constructing the Diaspora., p.11-12.  
21 Wilson, 1971: 8 cited in Robin Cohen, “Transnational Social Movements: An Assessment.”, 
WPTC 1998 10, Department of Sociology, University of Warwick. 
http://www.transcomm.ox.ac.uk/working%20papers/cohen.pdf. p. 4. 
22 Ash Garner and Zald, 1987: 293 cited in Robert Hackett & William K Carrol, “Remaking 
media. The Struggle to Democratize Public Communication”, London, Routledge. 2006, Chap. 3. 
p. 41. 
23 Ron Eyerman & Andrew Jamison, “Social Movements, A cognitive Approach”, Pennsylvania 
State University Pres(1991). p.4. 
24 Donatella della Porta & Mario Diani, “Social Movements: An Introduction”, Blackwell 
Publishers (2004). p. 15-16.  
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from interest groups and political parties; Or, being essentially made up of 
networks rather than working as an organizational body. As Della Porta and 
Diani state, social movements are: “…networks of interaction between different 
actors which may either include formal organizations or not, depending on 
shifting circumstances.” This definition fits the diaspora groups as well.25 
 
Moreover, social movements are usually perceived as movements that are 
oppositional and most of the time a challenge to the nation state.26 Most of the 
diasporic movements are also oppositional and a challenge to a nation state but 
they are organized in another host country to be able to act in such a manner. In 
addition, diaspora studies have a lot to gain from the social movements literature 
perspectives on network organization, political opportunities, collective identity 
and resource mobilization. It is evident that in today’s world, due to the 
improvements in technology, ways of communication and globalization, the old 
repertoires of contention are challenged by new transnational organizations, and 
diaspora groups contribute a lot to this new evolution.  
 
Another similarity between these two strands of literatures is that quite a number 
of diaspora groups are referred to as transnational advocacy groups regarding 
their mobilization and repertoires of action. It is, without doubt, questionable 
that all diasporas act like transnational advocacy networks, but there are certain 
similarities. Those networks are defined as vehicles for transnational activity 
around rights and social justice issues.27 Diasporas form policy networks that 
operate across state borders to influence policies both in the homeland and in the 
hostland, and, more importantly, their members have a common identity that 
transcends state borders.28 Moreover, transnational advocacy network activists, 
similar to the social movements activists, tend to have an agenda of claims-
making, to seek to make demands and also to pursue the rights of the less 
powerful win over the interests of the alleged interests of the more powerful.29 
Transnational advocacy networks by and large influence politics on issues such 
as environment, women’s rights etc. whereas diaspora groups usually try to 
influence politics on issues related to their homelands. Both groups might use the 
same repertoires of protest, the same patterns of organization, the same strategies 
for member mobilization yet they have fundamental differences.   
 
Adamson refers to the distinguished categories of transnational networks, 
following the definitions given by Kerk and Sikkink in their article Activists 
                                                 
25 Ibid.  
26  Swain, 2010 
27 Margaret E. Keck & Kathryn Sikkink.  “Activists Beyond Borders”, Ithaca, NY: Cornell 
University Press (1998).  p. 217. 
28 Sarah Wayland, “Ethnonationalist networks and transnational opportunities: the Sri Lankan 
Tamil diaspora.” Review of International Studies, 30-3 (2004): 405-426. p. 410. 
29 Keck & Sikkink., Activists Beyond Borders., p. 217. 
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Beyond Borders, and suggests that transnational advocacy networks are 
motivated primarily by shared principled ideas besides the other transnational 
networks that are motivated by shared causal ideas and instrumental goals, yet 
there is a missing link in this categorization. She argues that an additional 
category of transnational identity networks, which are primarily motivated by 
shared collective identity (such as ethnicity, nationality or religion), should be 
added to the categorization on transnational networks. According to her; 
“transnational identity networks are analytically distinct from transnational 
economic networks, transnational epistemic communities, or transnational 
advocacy networks.”30 Having accepted the idea that diaspora groups might act 
like transnational networks, there are certain differences in terms of identity 
which distinguishes them from transnational advocacy networks. As Adamson 
puts it: “Diasporas seek particularism rather than universalism, even if their basis 
may be a universal ideology such as nationalism.”31  
 
Furthermore, literature on both diaspora groups and social movements deals 
with the issues of social mobilization. How do social movements mobilize 
members and become prominent on affecting policy making? How do diaspora 
groups enlarge their networks and increase their influence on politics? According 
to Sökefeld, the diaspora literature may benefit from the social movements field 
with regards to those types of questions. He argues “those central dimensions of 
social movements are also important dimensions for the formation of diasporas 
as transnational imagined communities.” There are a number of labels under 
which those groups can be analyzed, such as: political opportunities, mobilizing 
structures and practices and framing.32  
 
Tarrow’s definition of political opportunity structure (POS) for the social 
movements literature is: “…consistent dimensions of the political environment 
that provide incentives for people to undertake collective action by affecting 
their expectations for success or failure.”33 This approach has been developed 
and interpreted for the field of citizenship and migrant incorporation by several 
authors and aimed at including both institutional and discursive dimensions of a 
political system.  For example if, and then how, the migrants are able to organize 
around certain ideas and to participate in decision making mechanisms of the 
receiving country. According to Wayland: “…they [political opportunity 
structures] are factors external to a movement that influence the movement’s 
emergence and chance of success. POS help explain why a challenger’s chances of 
                                                 
30 Adamson., Constructing the Diaspora.p. 12. 
31 Ibid.  
32 Sökefeld, Mobilizing in Transnational Space., p. 270. 
33 Sidney Tarrow. Power in Movement: Social Movements, Collective Action and Politics, 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994). p. 82-85.  
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engaging in successful collective action vary over time and why similar challenges 
may meet with very different results in different places.”34Therefore, POS in the 
host country may explain the dissimilar types of diasporic actions taken by 
various groups from the same homeland but follow different paths in different 
countries. 
 
It can be said that the openness of POS in a host country may enable the 
transnational migrant communities to form diasporic organizations more easily. 
Since mobilization is the key factor for these kinds of organizations, the 
openness of the system may facilitate recruiting members by using the political 
spheres to bring attention to the diaspora’s cause from both the members of the 
same ethnic/religious/ cultural group as well as policy makers in the host 
country. They may easily distribute flyers, organize seminars, give speeches, 
organize protests, use diaspora associations for propaganda etc. As mentioned in 
sections above, the openness of the structure might give them the chance to act 
like lobby or interest groups. On the other hand, if the system is closed for 
political opportunity structures, it might not facilitate the organizational 
procedure of diaspora formation. However, it might give more incentives to 
members of immigrant communities to get together and mobilize since they are 
suppressed in the host country. Giugni and Passy argue that closed POS tend to 
provoke more disruptive forms of action since the challengers need to raise the 
stakes in order to make their voices heard. However, in a closed system it 
becomes more costly to try to mobilize the masses.35  
 
The relation between the literatures on social movements and diaspora activism 
can be examined through many different perspectives such as the impact of host 
country political opportunity structures, framing, diasporic claims-making, the 
impact of the state controls (home and host country) on the emergence of those 
movements etc. However, this study particularly focuses on the repertoires of 
protests and nationalist actions. Having stated the main commonalities between 
these two literatures, the following section will try to single out the use of 
protest among diaspora members.  
 
Social Movements and Protest 
 
“In order to obtain voice, social movements employ methods of persuasion and 
coercion which are, more often then not, novel, unorthodox, dramatic and of 
questionable legitimacy.”36 Consequently, one the method often used by the 
                                                 
34 Wayland, Ethnonationalist Networks., p. 415.  
35 Marco Giugni & Florence Passy. “Migrant mobilization between political  institutions and 
citizenship regimes: A comparison of France and Switzerland”, April 2002. 
http://www.unil.ch/webdav/site/iepi/users/epibiri1/public/passy2.pdf. p. 3-4.  
36 Wilson, 1973: 227 cited in Donatella della Porta, “Eventful Protest, Global Conflicts.”, 
European University Institute Prepared for presentation at the plenary session of the Conference of 
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activists is protesting. As Della Porta puts it: “Protest has been in fact considered 
as the main repertoire of action—or even, the modus operandi—of social 
movements.”37 Therefore, the use of protest is one of the fundamental 
characteristics of social movements, although social movements do not have a 
monopoly on protest.38 Protests occur as an opposition to a particular 
government agency or just to a parliamentary process.39 In the diaspora context, 
their activities usually target state and its institutions.  
 
The state, by nature of its existence, is the institution responsible for formulating 
and carrying out policies for a society; yet sometimes it might lack the resources 
to function sufficiently in order to meet the expectations of various societal 
groups40 Therefore protests arise due to disagreement or dissatisfaction with the 
state policies. In this globalized world, protests may take different forms. They 
can not only be affected by transnational developments, they can even  become 
transnational themselves. Today, in the context of diaspora activism, what is seen 
is the emergence of transnational repertoires of protest. Diaspora groups protest 
against their own state or its institutions in another host state since it will put 
their “cause” in an international context and will enable the outcome to be more 
effective, than if the protests were held in the home country. Especially if the 
host country is a more democratic one compared to the home country, then the 
chances of having the aimed attention and reaction from the host government 
and the public becomes much higher. As it can be argued; “Democracies provide 
no immediate obstacles in mobilizing or organizing people on certain issues as 
liberty do, so it is supposed to be guaranteed by law and tradition.”41  
 
 As della Porta and Diani point out: “Protest has been considered as a form of 
action typical of social movements because, unlike political parties and pressure 
groups, they have fewer channels through which to access decision makers.”42 For 
this very reason, protests are essential tools used by diaspora movements to 
influence politics. Since they are groups of dispersed people, with lacking a 
formal organization that may have a direct impact on policy making, their only 
chance is to make their voice heard through protests and lobby activities. The 
use of protest is even more essential for the stateless diaspora groups who do not 
                                                                                                             
the Nordic Sociological Association, Aahrus, August 2008. 
http://www.bc.edu/schools/cas/sociology/meta-elements/pdf/EventfulProtest.pdf. p. 28.   
37 Ibid. p.1.  
38 Della Porta & Diani., Social Movements., p.170.  
39 Ashok Swain, Social Network & Social Movement: Are Northern Tools Useful to Evaluate 
Southern Protests?, Uppsala Peace Research Paper No. 4, Department of Peace and Conflict 
Research, Uppsala University, 2002, 33 pages. p. 4.  
40 Ibid. p.3. 
41 Ibid.   
42 Della Porta & Diani., Social Movements., p.170. 
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have a homeland government to address. Stateless diaspora groups, which come 
from a conflictual homeland and want to attract the attention of hostland 
governments and the international community, see protest as way of influencing 
the public opinion and the policy makers towards their concerns. That is why 
most of the time they are confused with transnational advocacy networks.  
Protest, due to its characteristic, might sustain a certain level of support and 
attention to the diasporic cause to some extent. Firstly, it is perceived as an 
unconventional method of intervening in a government’s decision making. 
Secondly, it uses indirect channels to influence decision makers.43 
 
Like social movement activists, diaspora activists also invent new strategies 
especially when they need to open new channels of access to the institutions both 
in the home and host country to express their voice. In many cases, they adopt 
non-traditional ways and forms of protests in order to capture the attention of 
the media. Those various forms may include a large number of people or a small 
number of individuals, or even a sole individual. They might be violent 
depending on the group and the circumstances since violence can be applied as a 
way of challenging an institution or showing one group’s anger to the public and 
policy makers.44  
 
The following section explores the most common protest mechanisms used by 
stateless diaspora groups by using Sri Lankan Tamils and Kurds from Turkey as 
case studies. The aim is to explore whether there is a common pattern of protest 
used by those groups since it is essential for them to use protest as a way of 
communicating with the public as well as with the policy makers of the host 
country and the international community.  
 
 Conflict in Sri Lanka and the Sri Lankan Tamil Diaspora 
 
The conflict in Sri Lanka involves two main ethnic groups - the Sinhalese, who 
are the majority population and live mostly in the south and the Tamils, who 
reside mostly in the north and east of this small island country. The violent 
conflict between the majority Sinhalese-dominated Sri Lankan government and 
the Tamil minority has a history dating back to several decades. Starting in the 
beginning of 1980’s, the on-and-off civil war raged until recently when the Sri 
Lankan leader Mahinda Rajapaksa declared the country "liberated" from Tamil 
Tiger rebels after a 26-year, resulting in the death of Velupillai Prabhakaran in 
2009. 
 
Although there was a formal ceasefire that was signed between the two warring 
parties in 2002, Sri Lanka had frequently found itself in the middle of military 
conflict between the government and the separatist Tamil group called the 
                                                 
43 Ibid. p. 168. 
44 (Swain 2010). 
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Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE). The Diaspora has played an 
important role in the various twists and turns taken by the Tamil insurgency in 
Sri Lanka and also it has been highly instrumental in shaping the Sri Lankan 
political landscape, particularly through its support for and sponsorship of the 
Tamil nationalist project, in other words, the struggle to carve out an 
independent Tamil homeland from northern Sri Lanka.45  
 
The contemporary transnational Sri Lankan Tamil (SLT) Diaspora was formed 
when hundreds of thousands of Sri Lankan Tamils fled to Europe, Asia and 
North America to escape the civil war.(Fair, 2005). It is estimated that the 
Diaspora accounts for 23-30 per cent of the global SLT population of 
approximately 2.7 million.46 The Diaspora is mostly concentrated in Canada 
(approx. 300,000), Switzerland (approx. 40,000), Norway (approx.10,000), 
France (approx. 40.000), UK (approx. 110,000), US and Australia (approx. 
30,000 each). This is why the SLT Diaspora is considered to have a strategic, 
political and economic value.  Some research claims that more than 700,000 Sri 
Lankan Tamils have fled from Sri Lanka over this period, while an equal number 
of displaced persons and former Tamil immigrants migrated to Europe, North 
America or Australia for work or study before 1983. Gunaratna claims that the 
pre- and post-1983 Sri Lankan Tamil émigrés are hardly distinguishable and 
that both groupings could be referred as the Tamil diaspora.47 However the 
members of the diaspora can be differentiated according to when they migrated, 
the means by which they gained residence in the host countries and by the extent 
to which they integrated into the host country. The diaspora community is by no 
means homogeneous considering the fact that there are pre-migratory cleavages 
along the lines of caste, class, gender and religion. This point of view also holds 
true concerning the variation of political views within the diaspora. Moreover 
notwithstanding the LTTE’s dominant position even after the death of its 
leader, long-distance Tamil nationalism contains tension over the LTTE’s claim 
to be the sole representative of all Tamils.48 However, in spite of these 
                                                 
45 Christine Fair, “Diaspora Involvement in Insurgencies: Insights from the Khalistan and Tamil 
EelamMovements,” Nationalism and Ethnic Politics 11(1) (Spring 2005); Dhananjayan 
Sriskandarajah, “Tamil Diaspora Politics,” in The Encyclopedia of Diasporas, eds. Melvin Ember, 
Carol Ember, and Ian Skoggard (New Haven, CT: Yale/Kluwer, 2004), pp. 493–501. 
46 Rajesh Venugopal, “The Global Dimensions of Conflict in Sri Lanka.” Paper presented to the 
conference on “Globalization and Self-determination Movements,” Pomona College (2003). 
47 Rohan Gunaratna. “Internationalisation of the Tamil Conflict and its Implications,” South Asia 
20 (Special Issue, 1997), pp. 119–151.  
48 See Sriskandarajah., Tamil Diaspora Politics.;  Zunzer, “Diaspora Communities and Civil 
Conflict Transformation.” Berghof Occasional Paper no. 26. Berlin: Berghof Research Centre for 
Constructive Conflict Management (2004).; Camilla Orjuela, “Distant Warriors, Distant Peace 
Workers? Multiple Diaspora Roles in Sri Lanka’s Violent Conflict”, Background paper of the 
High Level Expert Forum on 'Capacity Building for Peace and Development: Roles of Diaspora' 
(Toronto: University for Peace, 19-20 October 2006); Feargal Cochrane, Bahar Baser & Ashok 
Swain, "Home Thoughts from Abroad: Diasporas and Peace-Building in Northern Ireland and Sri 
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differences, the Sri Lankan Tamil Diaspora tries to project itself as a united 
community and its members try to promote the community ties further. The Sri 
Lankan Tamil Diaspora and its characteristics should be studied in the context 
of the recently concluded civil war in Sri Lanka as sustaining a society under 
stress, strain and displacement, which has been the essential function of the 
Tamil Diaspora.49 Since many of its members retain vivid memories of the 
traumatic events from their time in Sri Lanka, they tend to maintain their 
involvement with the political and military events in the island.50 
 
Kurdish Question in Turkey and the Kurdish Diaspora 
 
Since the foundation of the Turkish Republic in 1923, the Kurdish Question 
has been a chronic source of instability and violence in Turkey.51 There were 
several cases where the Kurdish uprisings were suppressed. Although the question 
at hand stayed dormant for a couple of decades, it reached its most violent form 
at the end of the 1970’s and early 1980’s by Turkish governments constant 
refusal to accept Kurds as having a different ethnic identity and grant them 
political, cultural and linguistic rights. The Kurdish question became a nested 
ethnic conflict and especially with the formation of certain Kurdish groups such 
as PKK, the struggle turned into a low-intensity civil war between the Turkish 
Army and the guerilla forces. Since then, it has been festering like a wound that 
gets deeper everyday and spills over abroad, especially to Europe by constant 
migration flows.   
 
The diffusion of conflict reveals itself by occasional protests, hunger strikes, 
violence among groups from both adversary groups etc. There is also the fact 
that it is not solely a problem for Turkey but because of the geo-strategic 
importance of the region and complexity of the political situation, it has effects 
in politics from the Middle East to Europe. The conflict itself is transnational as 
the Kurdish population is dispersed among several Middle Eastern countries. 
Furthermore, Turkey’s approach to the Kurdish problem in Turkey has changed 
immensely by the enforcement of EU accession laws. In addition, the previous 
discourse of Turkey’s total non-recognition of Kurds as a different ethnic group 
has been modified lately. For instance, the political, linguistic or cultural 
demands of the Kurdish minority became more visible during the last decade to 
                                                                                                             
Lanka", Studies in Conflict and Terrorism (Washington DC), vol. 32, Issue 8, 2009, pp. 681-
704. 
49 R.Cheran, “Diaspora Circulation and Transnationalism Agents for Change in the Post Conflict 
Zones of Sri Lanka.” Policy paper submitted toBerghof Foundation for ConflictManagement, 
Berlin, Germany, 2004.  
50 Venugopal., The Global Dimensions of Conflict in Sri Lanka.  
51 Hamit Bozarslan, ‘The Kurdish Question in Turkey Following 2003 Iraqi War’, in Mohammed, 
M. A. Ahmed; Gunter, Michael M. (eds.), The Kurdish Question and the 2003 Iraq War, Costa 
Mesa, Mazda Publishers (2005), pp.123-135. 
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Turkish politicians. The latest example of the improvements in Kurdish rights 
could be the launching of a new TV station which broadcasts in Kurdish. Still, 
there are so many things to be done in terms of resolving the conflict. 
 
The first Kurdish migration also started with the bilateral agreements between 
Turkey and various European countries. At that time, most of the Kurds 
migrated for mainly economic reasons and were treated as “Turkish migrants” 
since they had Turkish nationality. Kurdish migration to Europe had political 
reasons as well, such as the repression and the guerilla war or the military regime 
after the coup d’etat in 1980. “The migration patterns followed paths blazed by 
family and political networks and gave rise to a concentration in certain 
countries mainly Sweden, France and Germany.52 No precise and reliable census 
of the Kurdish diaspora in Europe has been recently carried out, but the most 
widely accepted estimates are about 850,000 distributed in Western Europe, 
500,000-600,000 of who live in Germany. According to other sources, the 
number is approximately 1 million consisting of 85 per cent from Turkey. 
According to many authors such as Demmers, a large number of Kurds that fled 
Turkey only discovered their “Kurdishness” in Germany where they could 
express their culture, language and organize themselves without repression.53 
“Kurdish people cannot express their Kurdish heritage in traditional Kurdistan; 
however they have found opportunities to do so in liberal western states.”54 
Some of those identity-based movements paved the way to the formation of 
extreme groups or nourished the already existing ones back in the homeland. As 
Curtis puts it: “PKK began to organize within Germany…bringing a Kurdish 
separatist movement to Germany.”55 However, one should note that Kurdish 
Diaspora is not homogenous. There are so many different layers and levels of 
affiliation with the homeland affairs. For instance: “The heightened sense of 
Kurdish nationalism in Turkey and its politicized offspring in Europe have 
failed to establish Kurdish ideological unity on a broader scale. Kurds in Europe 
have not articulated a common political agenda and Kurdish civil society actors 
appear unable or unwilling to agree on publicly identifiable positions or a 
representative voice.”56  
 
 
                                                 
52 Valerie Amiraux. “Turkey and the European Union: From Immigration to Integration.” (ed) 
Olivier Roy, “Turkey Today: A European Country? Anthem Press, London, 2005. p. 72. 
53 Joell Demmers, “New Wars and Diasporas: Suggestions for Research and Policy,” Journal of 
Peace, Conflict and Development, 11 (2007). p.17. 
54 Andy Curtis, “Nationalism in the Diaspora: A Study of the Kurdish Movement.” Nationalism, 
Ethnicity and Conflict, University of Utrecht, 4 February 2005, 
http://www.wekurd.com/AndyCurtisNationalismintheDiaspora.pdf. p.3. 
55 Ibid. p.8.  
56 Vera Eccarius-Kelly, "Interpreting the PKK's Signals in Europe," Perspectives on Terrorism 2, 
no. 11(2008), pp. 10-14.  
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Why these two cases? 
 
At a first glance the conflicts in Sri Lanka and Turkey may just seem to lack any 
connection but upon closer inspection, it will be easy to see the abundance of 
similarities between them. Firstly, both countries have/had been in civil war for 
more or less two decades. Although there are significant differences between the 
historical evolutions of these conflicts, after the 1980’s they followed a similar 
pattern.  
 
Secondly, the distribution of ethnic groups is quite the same in both countries; 
approximately 20 per cent minority to 80 per cent majority. Both minority 
groups make claims in for their cultural and linguistic rights which were 
restricted by the state. Thirdly, both separatist groups who claim to represent the 
minority group grievances were formed around the beginning of 1970’s, and 
around the beginning of the 1980’s, started an armed struggle and declared a war 
on the state in order to achieve their goals. Furthermore, the conflicts have not 
just stayed in the country of origin but they acquired regional as well as 
international importance. Both minority groups had kin groups in surrounding 
countries. It is also important to remember that other states played a role in both 
conflicts such as India and Iraq.  
 
 So many people have been arrested, killed or died during these struggles but also 
many more had been compelled to migrate to other countries for survival or 
other reasons such as economic or political ones. In the end, they created 
diaspora groups or cultivated the already existing ones. Today, both Sri Lankan 
Tamils and Kurds from Turkey are dispersed around the world. In the Sri 
Lankan case, the diaspora support is considered to be a fundamental part of the 
Tamil struggle against the Sri Lankan government and it is argued by many that 
the financial and political diaspora support is one of the main components that 
enable the LTTE to organize operations worldwide. It is widely perceived that 
the LTTE uses its international support network, embedded within the SLT 
diaspora for fund raising, arms procurement and international advocacy.57 The 
Kurdish diaspora also is used as a reference by many authors in order to illustrate 
diaspora links to the prolongation of conflicts in home countries. It should be 
taken into consideration that The Kurdish Diaspora in Europe substantially 
contributes to conflicts in the homeland by providing financial support to the 
rebel groups as well. It raises large sums of money in Europe to financially 
support the violent activities in Turkey and most of these contributions appear 
to be voluntary. 58The PKK engaged in political and fundraising activities that 
blurred the lines between politics and ordinary civic activity. Hoffman claims 
                                                 
57 Venugopal., The Global Dimensions of Conflict in Sri Lanka. 
58 Martin Van Bruinessen, “Shifting National and Ethnic Identities: the Kurds in Turkey and the 
European Diaspora”, Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs, 18, 1. pp. 39-52(1998). 
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that one half of the PKK’s budget during the 1990’s came from the Kurdish 
Diaspora in Europe.59  
 
However, those examples do not reflect the whole spectrum of Sri Lankan Tamil 
and Kurdish diaspora activities. The diasporas do much more then supposedly 
sending money back home in order to contribute to the separatist movements. 
This kind of a generalization would definitely be an underestimation of 
diasporic activities. There is a whole repertoire of long-distance nationalist 
activities that diaspora members can do voluntarily or involuntarily, with or 
without the usage of violence, collectively or individually, effective or non-
effective, transnationally or locally.  
 
Stateless Diasporas and Forms of Nationalist Actions In Terms Of Protests   
 
Signing Petitions & Organizing Campaigns 
 
Signing Petitions and organizing campaigns are one of the most popular 
methods used by diaspora activists in the host countries. Petitions can be 
accepted as one of the democratic and non-violent ways which diaspora activists 
use in order to bring their cause to the public attention. Those petitions can be 
later used to lobby the hostland governments and the international community 
to intervene to the home country matters.  
 
In the case of the Kurdish diaspora, the target can be the hostland governments 
as well as “the European Council, the Council of the European Union, the 
European Parliament, the European Commission, the European Court of Justice, 
the Council of Europe, and the European Court of Human Rights.”60 The 
petitions might be about any grievance that the diaspora has towards the 
homeland governments. For instance, there have been petitions organized to 
support Leyla Zana, a Kurdish politician jailed for her speeches against the 
Turkish government. Activists were asking the European community and 
member state governments to act against her arrest and wanted them to push 
Turkey to release her.61  
 
Sri Lankan Tamils organized several petitions on various subjects as well. In May 
2009, there was a petition organized by the diaspora members to stop the IMF 
loan to Sri Lanka.62 What was more efficient in the Tamil case was the so-called 
                                                 
59 Bruce Hoffman, “Radicalisation, Terrorism and Diasporas.”(2007) P.1-4. 
http://www.rand.org/pubs/conf_proceedings/2007/RAND_CF229.pdf 
60 Thomas Renard, “Kurdish Activism in Europe: Terrorism versus Europeanization", Terrorism 
Monitor, Volume 6, Issue 13 (June 26, 2008). 
61http://kurde-moyen-orient.20minutes-blogs.fr/archive/2009/03/19/petition-pour-leyla-
zana.html 
62 http://www.gopetition.com/petitions/stop-imf-loan-to-sri-lankan-goverment.html 
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“Key Campaign” organized by diaspora activists. The British Tamil Forum 
launched a campaign which brought the conditions in Sri Lanka to the eyes of 
the British public and received attention from UK Parliamentarians, human 
rights activists, councilors and members of the community organizations. The 
idea was to put stress on the diaspora’s demand to “unlock the Concentration 
camps in Sri Lanka.63 The campaign is accompanied by demonstrations, which 
included chanting slogans and holding banners.  
 
Non-Violent Mass Demonstrations and Marches 
  
Mass demonstration is a form of protest which is used frequently by social 
movement activists as well as by diaspora members who are trying to make their 
voice heard through non-institutional channels. Demonstrations are usually 
organized by one or more organizations, start with a march and then gets 
attention from the media and the public. It may include chanting slogans and 
may end with a declaration. As della Porta puts it: “Mass demonstrations are so 
accompanied by direct actions such as blocking roads or railway lines that, 
although excluding violence, represent a challenge to the state in terms of public 
order.”64  Many diaspora activists utilized this type of non violent protest in 
order to influence public opinion and attract the attention of policy makers etc. 
At this point, we can divide the reasons for diaspora protest into two categories: 
a) demonstrating for policy change or justice in the homeland, b) demonstrating 
for policy change or justice in the host country.  
 
 In the Kurdish case, demonstrations are highly utilized, especially right after 
crucial periods in the course of the low-scale civil war in Turkey both against the 
homeland and the host country. A few examples may be given as follows: For the 
first category, there are too many examples in the Kurdish diaspora activism that 
one cannot count. Different groups from the Kurdish diaspora organized various 
demonstrations in Germany to protest against the political situation and attitude 
of the Turkish government towards the violation of minority rights in Turkey.65  
 
As Lyon & Ucarer state: “…in April 1990, 10,000 Kurds assembled in front of 
the Gothic Cologne Cathedral in a demonstration that was supported by the 
PKK. They protested against the military course pursued by Turkey against its 
Kurdish minority and called for Kurdish autonomy in Turkey. Likewise, the 
PKK’s thirteenth birthday was celebrated in a peaceful gathering by 8,000 in 
Bremen on 9 December 1991... In many of these cases, either large urban centers 
were selected as places to gather, helping visibility, or the protests were staged in 
front of the various Turkish consulates in the country, focusing attention on the 
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country that they charged with causing the plight of Kurds.”66 For the second 
category, one might give the examples of the ban on PKK in Germany in 1993 
which ended up with large scale demonstrations by the diaspora members who 
support the policies of PKK.67 Some of those demonstrations ended up with 
violence and will be mentioned in the next pages.  
 
The Sri Lankan Tamil diaspora also utilizes mass demonstrations to bring the 
conflict in their home country to the attention of the public. There have been 
large-scale demonstrations too, after the ban on LTTE. For instance in Canada, 
many thousands of people protested against the ban on LTTE. However, since 
2006 Canada has put a ban on the LTTE considering it as a terrorist 
organization and it does not grant asylum to the people who are affiliated with 
LTTE or crimes against humanity.68 Since 2006, many EU member countries 
also banned on LTTE and started taking measures under the new terrorism 
framework, which caused reactions by diaspora members in various EU countries 
such as France69. Another mass demonstration, for instance, took place in 
Canada, in March 2009 by forming a 7 kilometers human chain consisting of Sri 
Lankan Tamil diaspora members in order to protest at the Sri Lankan 
government’s treatment of Tamils in Sri Lanka.70 Especially in 2009, there had 
been many demonstrations organized by the Tamil Diaspora activists in order to 
bring attention to the concerns about the civilian plight in Sri Lanka right after 
the government’s determination to end the LTTE presence in Sri Lanka. 
Diaspora groups organized many protests all around the world including Canada 
and Australia, calling for a ceasefire in Sri Lanka as LTTE was facing heavy 
military defeat. 
 
Violent Demonstrations & Riots 
 
Violent demonstrations also took place in both Sri Lankan Tamil and Kurdish 
cases. It is possible that a non-violent mass demonstration turned into a violent 
one by the intervention of the police or by coincidence; or the intention was 
applying violence since the beginning. Violence (on property or at an inter-
personal level) also tends to occur if there is a counter protest in tandem with the 
protest of an adversary group.  
 
                                                 
66 Alynna J. Lyon & Emek M. Uçarer. “Mobilizing Ethnic Conflict: Kurdish Separatism in 
Germany and the PKK.” Paper prepared for presentation on the panel on "Stateless Ethnic 
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67 Curtis., Nationalism in the Diaspora. p.8. 
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In the Kurdish case, the capture of Öcalan, the leader of PKK was a breaking 
point. Most of the violent conflicts happened right after Ocalan was arrested by 
Turkish forces. There had been various violent demonstrations and attacks to 
Turkish properties, embassies, consulates and shops in several European 
countries. For example, in Heilbronn in Germany, diaspora activists who 
supported the PKK threw Molotov cocktails to a Turkish cultural center and 
attacked some Turkish people with baseball bats. Similar incidents happened in 
different parts of Germany despite the risk of being deported.71 Violent 
demonstrations also occurred between Turkish and Kurdish diaspora groups in 
various European cities, such as Oslo, where a fight broke out between the 
Kurdish and Turkish protesters and only ended after Norwegian police 
intervention in November 2007 right after Iraq gave permission to Turkey to 
continue its war against the PKK militant bases in Northern Iraq.72 
 
There have been also incidents of “occupations.” Right after the capture of 
Ocalan, some Kurdish diaspora groups occupied Turkish and Greek Embassies 
and Consulates in various countries in order to protest his arrest. In many cases 
it became brutal such as in the riots in Ottawa on 8 November 2000 when 
Kurdish demonstrators threw a gasoline bomb at a police officer and set him on 
fire.73 “In March 1996, thousands of Kurds throughout Germany used the 
Kurdish New Year celebrations to protest against the situation in Turkey. The 
outcome was especially violent in Dortmund, 40 police officers and 300 
demonstrators were injured, 600 were arrested, and 1900 temporarily held. After 
this, the German government announced it would deport foreigners who take 
part in illegal demonstrations.”74  
 
Sri Lankan Tamils also committed violent demonstrations. For example, during 
a demonstration in London in April 2009, a group of LTTE supporters started 
using violence and smashed the windows of the Indian and Sri Lankan High 
Commission buildings which also led to various police officers getting injured by 
stone throwing by the diaspora members.75 In Paris, some Tamil demonstrations 
turned violent as in the case of the mass demonstration of April 2009 when 
French police arrested 210 Tamils for the use of violence during the protest 
including throwing bottles at the police and damaging property by smashing cars 
and burning scooters.76 Mass demonstrations among stateless diaspora groups are 
usually non-violent however if they happen after a critical development in the 
home country, they may well turn into violent protests as demonstrated above.   
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Sit-in Strategy 
 
The sit-in is a non-violent strategy which is also frequently used by diaspora 
activists in order to make their claims heard. Although in its nature it is 
considered to be non-violent, in some cases it might end with violence, especially 
right after an intervention by the police. While talking about the student 
movements Kreider defines “sit-in” as “any attempt by a group of people to 
occupy a space … for a long period of time (days rather than hours).”77  
 
The Kurdish diaspora activists used the “sit-in” strategy right after Germany put 
a ban on PKK as a terrorist group in 1993. Protesters organized a sit-in right in 
front of the Turkish Consulate in Karlsruhe which then turned into attempts to 
break in to the Turkish consulate and clashes with the police.78.  As for the Sri 
Lankan Tamil case, the sit-in strategy is recently combined with hunger strikes. 
The example of April 2009 incidents in Australia demonstrates the decisiveness 
of the diaspora activists to raise their voice. Different groups organized hunger 
strikes and sit-ins in different places and then they merged in Canberra making a 
declaration about the course of the war back at home: “The Australian Tamils 
have conducted and will continue to conduct peaceful protests. Yet the 
Australian government continues to ignore the Sri Lankan State genocide taking 
place against the Tamils. The UN has warned of a bloodbath for the 100 000 
civilians living in the no-fire zone if the army move into it. This has already 
happened. Kevin Rudd must not continue to remain silent. ... Kevin Rudd as our 
prime minister, we urge you and plead with you to recognize and acknowledge 
our legitimate grievances.”79 There were these types of protests all around the 
world for the Kurdish and the Tamil causes yet their impact was not as effective 
as intended.  
 
Hunger Strikes 
 
Hunger strike is considered to be a non-violent form of protest, which is also 
used in order to attract the attention of the public, media or governments for a 
specific policy change. “Hunger strike is described as voluntary refusal of food 
and/or fluids. Prolonged starvation may produce many adverse events including 
even death in rare circumstances.”80 It is a common form of protest which is used 
by groups who want to provoke feelings of guilt and responsibility in certain 
groups in order to achieve their purpose.  
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In the Kurdish case, this method has been used widely in many phases of the 
historical process of the conflict varying from important breaking points such as 
the Turkish intervention in Iraq to the cases where Kurds in Europe wanted to 
protest at the capture of a leader or a member of their community. For instance, 
in June 2009, Kurds in Dublin organized a hunger strike in order to protest at 
the imprisonment of their leader Remzi Kartal and his handing over to Turkish 
authorities by preparing a camp in front of EU’s Dublin headquarters.81 Hunger 
strike is also used as a form of protest during the contentious times right after 
the capture of Ocalan. A group of Kurdish activists organized a hunger strike 
and informed the public and the media that they will go on until their voices 
have been heard by the authorities.82  
 
The Sri Lankan Tamils also used hunger strikes as a form of protest. For 
instance; in April 2009, two young Tamils started a hunger strike in front of the 
Parliament Square, constantly giving press declarations and talking about the 
problems of Tamils in Sri Lanka, they tried to bring public attention to their 
cause.83 They said they are willing to die unless the UK intervenes in the conflict 
in Sri Lanka and they asked permission for their representatives to arrange a 
meeting with the Prime Minister Gordon Brown and UN secretary general Ban 
Ki-moon.”84 
 
There are many more hunger strike cases among these two diaspora groups. 
These types of protests are thought to be successful in that they often garner 
immense media attention.  Despite this fact, it is unclear if they are truly effective 
in pushing authorities to react to the activists' demands. 
 
The Cases of Self Immolation 
 
Although it is not the most common protest form used by diaspora members, a 
few cases of self immolation exist, especially after traumatic developments in the 
homeland. As Biggs mentions, the use of self immolation as a protest form “is 
usually intended to appeal to bystander publics or to exhort others to greater 
efforts on behalf of the cause.”  He defines the action as “an individual 
intentionally kills herself or himself, or at least causes physical harm likely to be 
fatal”. According to him, the act is not aimed to harm others but just one’s self 
and it is committed to contribute to a collective cause rather than a personal one; 
and lastly it is performed in a public space, or accompanied by a written letter 
                                                 
81 http://www.indymedia.ie/article/92558 
82http://www.independent.co.uk/news/kurd-protests-hostagetakers-start-hunger-strike-
1071554.html 
83 http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2009/apr/11/srilanka-protest 
84 http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/7994181.stm 
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addressed to political figures or to the general public about a collective issue.85 At 
this point, one can give examples from Kurdish and Sri Lankan Tamil diasporas 
which very well fit this given criteria. 
 
In the Kurdish case, a 14-year-old girl set herself on fire in London right after 
the capture of PKK leader Abdullah Ocalan in 1999 in order to protest at his 
capture and Turkish policies on Kurds in the eastern part of Turkey. Her aim 
was to attract attention from the British public and the media about the Kurdish 
cause in Turkey. As she explained afterwards, she wanted the British public to 
stop and think about the Kurdish population. This was not the only incident to 
protest at Ocalan’s capture. At that day many Kurds declared that, “if necessary, 
they would kill themselves in trying to free their leader.”86  For instance there 
were such cases similar to the one in London, in Stuttgart a 17-year-old Kurdish 
girl was badly injured after dousing herself in petrol and in Copenhagen another 
woman has also committed self-immolation. It seems like those incidents were 
effective in their aim to some extent since it received significant attention from 
the global media and the people who committed those acts received support and 
encouragement from all around the world.  
 
With regard to the Sri Lankan case, in January and February 2009, when the Sri 
Lankan government was advancing its war against the LTTE, there were 7 self-
immolation incidents among the Sri Lankan Tamils in Europe and in India in 
order to protest the Sri Lankan government’s treatment to Tamils in Sri Lanka. 
Especially one case got media interest. He was a 26-year-old Sri Lankan Tamil 
who burned himself to death in Genève in February 2009. As in the self 
immolation definition given by Biggs, he has left a letter in Tamil and in English 
saying: “"We Tamils displaced and all over the world, loudly raised our 
problems and asked for help before [the] international community in your own 
language for three decades. But nothing happened ... So I decided to sacrifice my 
life ... The flames over my body will be a torch to guide you through the 
liberation path."87 Although self immolation stands out among the other forms 
of protests, as can be seen from the examples, it is not unforeseeable.  
 
Conclusion 
 
Scarcity of resources, underdevelopment, economic necessity and finally and 
most importantly violent conflicts in the South force people to leave their 
homeland and to migrate. With the increasing number, diaspora groups’ 
potential to act as non-state actors also keeps on growing.  Thus, it is important 
                                                 
85 Michael Biggs, “The Transnational Diffusion of Protest by Self-Immolation”. 
http://www.wzb.eu/zkd/zcm/pdf/presentation/biggs06_berlin.pdf 
86 http://www.independent.co.uk/news/hour-by-hour-a-new-kurd-attack-1071302.html 
87 http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2009/feb/19/tamil-suicide-protest-geneva 
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and essential to study and analyze the process and potential of diaspora 
mobilization.  
 
This paper has made an attempt to incorporate two strands of literature, social 
movements and diaspora studies, in order to better understand diaspora 
mobilization in this globalised world. By closely looking at two cases, Sri Lankan 
Tamils and Kurds from Turkey, it has attempted to gain a general understanding 
of stateless diaspora activism in the social movements context. As it has been 
discussed, diasporas are dependent on opportunity structures in their host 
countries. They mobilize resources, organize transnationally and act aggressively 
as they could in order to bring their cause to the attention of the public and the 
host countrys’ policy makers.  If one gives a serious thought to the situation of 
stateless diasporas in the world today, it would not be hard to see that being 
mobilized like social movement organizations is probably their best choice to 
make their voice heard. If the hostland decides to close this window, they might 
find a way to get through it and open another one. They have manifold 
attachments to their imaginary / actual homeland, to the country they were born 
and to the country they currently reside. They are sometimes various groups 
working together, sometimes groups that are in rivalry. Since their problems are 
usually with the state of origin, the usual conventional ways of affecting policy 
making are very much limited for them. What they are left with are forms of 
protest activities in hostland, such as demonstrations, hunger strikes, riots and 
campaigns.  
 
This paper also argues that the literatures on social movements and diaspora 
activism go together and forms of diaspora mobilization could be analyzed as a 
subset of social movements. The literature, which perceives diaspora groups as 
irrational long-distance nationalist communities should be reconsidered in the 
light of resource mobilization approach. Moreover, the impact of political 
opportunity structure of the host country on diaspora activism is a very 
important subject that is mostly overlooked in the diaspora literature. It is 
important for the future research in this field to examine how the political 
opportunity structure affect specific strategies of diaspora mobilization and if 
there is a variation between the offered opportunity structures to different 
groups. The other area for future research interest could be to measure the 
impacts of diaspora mobilization on host country’s policy making. The impacts 
of Kurdish and Tamil activism showed varied results in Europe in different 
countries. There is no doubt that the social movements literature opens up a 
wide range of theoretical tools to analyze diaspora mobilization. 
